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Who guards the guardians of monetary stability and financial
stability? That is the key question behind the debate about
the accountability of the Bank of England
Rosa Lastra unpicks the debate surrounding the accountability of the increasingly powerful
Bank of England. She argues that the Bank of England should be made accountable to
Parliament, and calls for a better understanding of how we should assess the Bank’s role in
creating financial stability.
According to the new framework proposed by the government the Bank of England is to
become a very powerful institution. It will have several hats: as monetary authority, lender of
last resort, supervisor on a macro and micro level, administrator of the Special Resolution
Regime and general guardian of financial stability.
With power comes responsibility. Though accountability is an evasive concept, it can be defined as an
obligation owed by one person or institution (the accountable) to another (the accountee) according to which
the former (in this case, the Bank of England) must give account of, explain and justify the actions, omissions
or decisions taken against criteria of some kind, and take responsibility for any fault or damage.
Accountability thus presupposes that the accountable and the accountee cannot be the same institution.
The question then arises: to whom should the Bank of England be accountable? Parliament is best suited to
guard the guardians of monetary and financial stability in a parliamentary democracy. However, MPs need to
be well-versed in monetary and financial affairs to act as an effective counterweight. And they need time,
information and resources.
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That is why I have, since 1997,
advocated that the Treasury Committee
could appoint a sub-committee with the
specific task of monitoring the Bank of
England. All the members of this sub-
committee (three or five) should have the
technical expertise required to deal with
monetary matters and it should be a
multi-partisan body. The stakes are too
high to leave this issue in the hands of
politicians or parliamentarians for whom
the intricacies of financial markets and
monetary policy may hinder the proper
exercise of accountability.
The Bank of England should be
accountable to parliament (House of Commons), to judicial review and to audit control. And it should also be
accountable to the Treasury. Of course, one problem in the design of an ‘accountable independence’ lies in
the possible reversal of the intended objective of ‘depoliticising’ the pursuit of monetary and financial
stability. Indeed, if too much independence can lead to the creation of a democratically unacceptable ‘state
within the state,’ too much accountability threatens the effectiveness of independence.
With regard to monetary policy, it is the chancellor who sets the inflation target (with an obligation imposed
on the Monetary Policy Committee to report back to the chancellor if inflation deviates from the target by
exceeding the bands imposed upon it); with regard to financial stability, it is a goal that transcends
institutional boundaries: the Treasury must be involved, in particular when public funds are committed.
Any form of accountability presupposes that there are objectives or standards according to which an action
or decision might be assessed. In other words, accountability implies an obligation to comply with certain
standards in the exercise of power or to achieve specific goals. The more complex the activity, the more
difficult it is to establish clear standards of conduct and specific outcomes. And complexity frustrates
accountability.
Given this, according to which criteria or targets should we measure the accountability of the Bank of
England? When it comes to monetary stability, the measurement of inflation (the inflation target) provides a
clear quantifiable indicator. But when it comes to financial stability, we have not reached a consensus yet as
to which are the best indicators. And if we do not have criteria of assessment then the content of the
obligation becomes vague, and accountability becomes ever more evasive.
That is why Charles Goodhart, economist and former MPC member, in his written evidence to the House of
Commons Treasury Committee proposed the adoption of early warning indicators which tend to precede
financial crises, including:
1. ‘A rate of growth of (bank) credit which is significantly faster than average, and above its normal trend
relationship to nominal incomes;
2. A rate of growth of housing (and property) prices which is significantly faster than normal and above
its normal trend relationship with incomes.
3. A rate of growth of leverage, among the various sectors of the economy which is significantly faster
than usual and above its normal trend relationship with incomes’.
Any recent discussion of accountability often includes a reference to transparency and vice versa. This
poses the question of the relationship between the two concepts. Accountability is an obligation to give
account of, explain and justify one’s actions, while transparency is the degree to which information on such
actions is available.
A downside of transparency concerns panics. Certain supervisory decisions require a degree of
confidentiality, given the psychological connotations of bank panic and contagion. For instance, the need for
covert assistance in the case of lender of last resort operations is of particular importance to contain a crisis,
since the belief in a panic is self-fulfilling and the fact that an institution is known to require official assistance
may trigger the very run the authorities are keen to prevent, and thus ‘stigmatize’ the provision of such
assistance.
These considerations put transparency for supervisory decisions and the accountability of those taking such
decisions in a different category from transparency for monetary policy decisions, where the arguments are
overwhelmingly in favour of disclosure.
Safe money and sound banking (in modern terminology: monetary stability and financial stability) are the twin
goals of central banks. Insufficient attention to financial stability issues in the years that preceded the crisis
was one of the many causes that triggered the ‘retreat from sanity’ (in Galbraith’s words) that the events in
2008 signified.
But the supervisory failures were rooted in failures of ‘how to supervise’, not in failures of ‘who supervises’.
That is why all supervisory structures failed in their duty, whether one, two or many supervisors, and whether
or not central banks were in charge of supervision, like in the US, where the Federal Reserve System had
and has supervisory powers.
In the UK, the FSA is now being dismantled and the government is tinkering with reform of supervisory
structure, once again. Surely the Bank of England is the institution best suited to undertake both monetary
policy and macro prudential supervision (given its view of the forest), but the arguments for micro
supervision (view of each tree) are more finely tuned and there is a compelling case for not having the
Special Resolution Regime (SRR) under its umbrella, considering its lender of last resort mandate, since an
institution might be reluctant to approach the Bank for liquidity assistance if it fears it might be subject to
SRR.
And while the Bank, as equidistant between the government and the financial system, is best suited to
control systemic risk, it cannot do it alone. Like a tsunami, episodes of financial instability do not respect
geographic borders.
Hence the need for adequate supranational (at the EU level) and international co-operation, co-ordination
and exchange of information. The issues of parliamentary accountability and the degree of transparency that
is needed with regard to the disclosure of central bank decisions are complex and difficult issues. However,
with the increased powers given to the Bank of England they must be addressed and solved in an
appropriate manner.
This article first appeared in the July 2011 edition of Parliamentary Brief.

